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Whether social protection benefits should be assigned to all (universal) or kept only 
for those who meet certain criteria (targeting) remains one of the most contentious 
questions in social policy research. The purpose of this brief is to revisit two social 
policy assumptions around basic concerns of efficiency, affordability and 
sustainability of universal social pensions. Contrary to what many international 
organisations and scholars have argued, this brief forwards that universal social 
pensions are economically viable and efficient strategies to produce welfare and 
alleviate older-age income deprivations. The world clearly has the resources to 
implement basic social pensions on a global scale; the question is if there is also the 
political will to do it.   
Key messages 
 Seventy-nine countries would be economically able to shift from targeted non-
contributory pensions to basic universal non-contributory pensions with less 
than 1.2 per cent of the respective national GDPs. 
 Sixteen countries
 
have means-tested/regional-tested non-contributory pensions 
more expensive than a hypothetical basic universal pension. 
 An arbitrary threshold of “economic development” is not a limitation for 
implementing social pensions. At least 16 countries with a relatively low 
economic development have successfully implemented social pensions without 
targeting beneficiaries by means.  
 Universal social pensions are politically and economically viable and are 
efficient strategies to alleviate income poverty. 
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Whether social protection benefits should be assigned to all (universal) or kept only 
for those who meet certain criteria (targeting) remains one of the most contentious 
questions for social protection policy in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).  
The core of the debate is, generally speaking, in the process – mainly how to target 
interventions. Over the last three decades, national and international actors have 
steered towards targeting with a focus on means, with arguments of efficiency and 
affordability typically at the forefront of justifications (Mkandawire 2005). Several 
driving forces and arguments have been used to support a generally residual 
approach to social policy provision. Means testing has been the dominant theory of 
addressing income poverty reduction globally, and it is this narrative which therefore 
deserves critique. This brief looks specifically at two assumptions used in support of 
means testing, using old-age pensions as the object of study. Each assumption is 
assessed using a combination of literature review and statistical analysis, within a 
global perspective. The question which is really under scrutiny is whether means 
testing is really the best approach to alleviate income poverty
1
, satisfy social risks and 
promote wellbeing. 
Assumption 1: With an under-developed taxation system, there is no alternative 
than to target the income poor to alleviate monetary deprivations.   
Assumption 2: “Poor” countries should wait to cross the threshold of “economic 
development” before implementing sustainable social pensions.  
These assumptions are not exhaustive – for example, others have argued that means 
testing suffers from inherent flaws as relates to failing to reach all intended recipients 
(exclusion errors) and allowing others to benefit who are otherwise not intended to 
(inclusion errors) (Devereux 2016; Kidd 2015). Similarly, the costs of administering 
means tested benefits have been shown to often outweigh the benefits of restricting 
receipt to segments of the population (financial, political, and social). That said, this 
brief focuses on two broad assumptions which lie at the heart of more mechanical 
responses to the advocacy of more universal strategies.  
Assumption 1: Under-developed taxation systems 
necessitate means testing 
This first assumption revolves around the basic concerns of efficiency and 
affordability. Taxation is by far one of the predominant funding sources for 
governments; under-developed tax systems limit their capacity to mobilise and 
allocate resources for public purposes. Given that tax revenue is expected to be low 
and insufficient with an under-developed tax system, the simple logic implies that 
countries must be efficient in the distribution of the resources – i.e. spend less. The 
constraints faced due to the absence of an institutionalised or adequate tax system 
are evident and undeniable.  
Tax revenues are considerably lower in LMICs than in, say, the European region. This 
is indeed a significant limitation, which must be addressed and (urgently) taken into 
account. The need to implement, restructure and/or develop a progressive taxation 
system is a generally accepted issue. Given the fact that such systems do not (yet) 
exist in many LMICs, this should not entail that low- and middle-income countries are 
destined to implement means-tested programmes with “poor benefits” (Sen 1995).  
According to the latest HelpAge International database (HelpAge International 2015), 
102 countries maintain non-contributory pension programmes. Only 17 of those 
countries provide universal non-contributory pensions – i.e. pensions which are not 
restricted by some form of targeting outside age limits. The remaining 85 implement 
particular forms of targeting (e.g. regional, means-tested, residence, or a combination 
of them) to identify “truly deserving” older-age individuals. While some within this 
group come near to universal schemes, they remain outside the category of the latter. 
Using the latest age-disaggregated data from the United Nations Population Division 
(UNPD 2015), the investment needed to implement a universal non-contributory 
pension is estimated across countries which have already implemented means-
The need to 
implement, 
restructure and/or 
develop a 
progressive 
taxation system is 
a generally 
accepted issue. 
1. The value of the widely used 
international income poverty 
line is US$1.90 at 2011 PPP. 
The use of this threshold to 
measure poverty or income 
poverty has received many 
criticisms over the years, 
because poverty is much more 
than income deprivations (Cruz-
Martínez 2015a; Cruz-Martínez 
2015b) and because a threshold 
this low limits the ability to 
actually know the number of 
people in poverty (Boltvinik 
2003). 
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tested/regional-tested non-contributory pensions. To calculate the investment needed 
for universal pensions, a modified model of Willmore's (2007) formula is used, adding 
5 per cent of the total cost of transfers as administrative cost, previously proposed by 
Knox-Vydmanov (2011). This formula is given as: 
 
𝑆𝑖 = 𝑟𝑝 + 𝐴𝑐 
 
Where Si is the social investment needed – in percentage points of GDP – to 
implement a basic universal non-contributory pension, r is the ratio of the universal 
pension to per capita GDP (pension level), p is the proportion of the population 
eligible for pensions (age eligibility), and Ac is the administrative cost of the transfer. 
The data used is from 2015 and allows the inclusion of 79 countries – out of the 85 – 
which have already implemented means-tested/regional-tested non-contributory 
pensions.  
The age eligibility for actual pensions varies considerably between countries. In order 
to examine different scenarios, five eligibility ages are considered: 50, 60, 65, 70, and 
75. One pension scenario is considered: a pension equivalent to 10 per cent of GDP 
per capita. Countries considered in this study present diverse economic, social, and 
political realities; therefore, this pension level should be considered as a “lab test” – 
arbitrarily assigned – and does not necessarily represent an adequate basic income 
for all countries. 
Using 75 as the eligibility age may not be ideal, especially for low and middle-income 
countries where life expectancy is shorter than for high-income countries. Cost 
concerns typically hamper intervention at lower ages, and it is important to 
acknowledge these concerns. To solve this issue, Knox-Vydmanov (2011:2) proposed 
implementing social pensions with higher eligibility ages in order to lower its initial 
cost, “with the intention to gradually reduce the eligibility age as political support and 
financial resources grow”.  
Freeland (2013) argues that the unaffordability argument of universal social 
protection is (unnecessarily and overly) exaggerated, “affordability is much more 
closely associated with political will than with fiscal resources”. There are other 
means of finding the fiscal space to promote income security in old age via social 
pensions – e.g. re-allocation of government spending towards social ends. 
Governments across the world have budgets and resources allocated to various areas 
of public and private concern. If we put increasing tax revenues aside and look at 
uses of existing funds, we can look at what would happen if governments shifted 
budget resources from other areas of social spending into universal non-contributory 
pensions.  
With less than 1.2 per cent of the respective national GDPs, all 79 countries would be 
able to shift from targeted non-contributory pensions to universal non-contributory 
pensions with a benefit level of 10 per cent of GDP per capita and with an age of 
eligibility of 75. This number is increased to 2.4 per cent of GDP if the benefit level is 
increased to 20 per cent of GDP per capita (not shown here). Figure 1 (page 4) shows 
the investment needed to implement a universal non-contributory pension for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Broadening these results, the same analysis is carried 
out for the remaining global regions.
2
 
According to the latest data from Pension Watch(HelpAge International 2015), 16 
countries
3
 have tested (means and/or regional), non-contributory pensions more 
expensive than a hypothetical universal pension with a benefit level of 10 per cent of 
GDP per capita and with an age of eligibility of 75.  
With less than 1.2 
per cent of the 
respective national 
GDPs, all 79 
countries would be 
able to shift from 
targeted non-
contributory 
pensions to 
universal non-
contributory 
pensions. 
2. Detailed analysis available 
upon request. 
3. Australia, Brazil, Cape Verde, 
Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, 
Lesotho, Maldives, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Norway, 
Paraguay, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Venezuela. 
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Here it is useful to take some spending priorities into consideration – for instance, 
civil servant pensions. Malaysia, for instance, would be able to finance a universal 
non-contributory pension at 20 per cent GDP per capita and an eligibility age of 60 
with the resources used in 2012 on civil servants’ pensions – entailing that around 9.2 
per cent of the population would benefit directly from this pension system, with 
around 0.7 per cent of its GDP remaining for other expenditures.
4
 Cape Verde, on the 
other hand, could potentially readjust its civil servants’ pension expenditure to 
subsidise a basic universal pension with the same benefit level as Malaysia and an 
age of eligibility of 65. The same is true for Kenya (benefit level of 10 per cent of GDP 
per capita and an age of eligibility of 70), and Mozambique (benefit level of 10 per cent 
GDP per capita and an age of eligibility of 75).  
These, however, are merely illustrative examples and not recommendations per se – 
this brief does not advocate for the reduction or redistribution of any particular area of 
government spending. However, the previous examples do illustrate the potential of 
extending social protection from existing budgetary outlays which may work in 
tandem with further reallocations and increased savings from efficiency adjustments 
(e.g. gains made in upgrading administrative systems and contribution collections).
5
  
Even with “under-developed” tax systems and other limitations faced by LMICs, 
resources exist to avoid most, if not all, basic income deprivations which older 
individuals are particularly exposed to. The key is the political acumen and 
commitment to determine and develop the means of financing investments into social 
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Figure 1: Social investment needed to implement a universal social pension in 21 Latin American 
and Caribbean countries which have already implemented means-tested and regional-tested non-
contributory pensions 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UNPD, 2015  
4. Author’s calculation using 
data from the World Bank 
(2013). 
5. Governments should remain 
attentive to adjusting spending 
towards both productive 
spending, as well as ensuring 
that social rights are protected 
and equalised. 
% GDP 
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protection rather than a simplistic default solution to excluding all but the most 
egregious cases of poverty in old age. 
Assumption 2: “Poor” countries should wait to cross the 
threshold of “economic development” before 
implementing sustainable social pensions  
This assumption centres also on the premise of affordability and brings to light the 
issue of sustainability of social protection systems. Based largely on the logic of 
industrialism and Wagner’s Law, a selection of social policy scholarship has 
forwarded the idea that a certain degree of economic development is requisite to 
develop an institutionalised social protection system. More simply, surpluses 
generated by the process of industrialisation provides extra financial resources to 
increase and sustain the development of social protection programmes. At the same 
time, the transition from pre-industrial modes of social reproduction facilitates 
political support by the workforce for such interventions (Esping-Andersen 1990; 
Scarbrough 2000). 
 Essentially, as society begins to generate the resources needed to fund social 
protection systems, the polity increases its support for protection. Von Gliszczynski 
(2015) argues that development experts and agencies have, following this logic, 
assumed that by reaching a threshold of economic development LMICs will then have 
the capacity to overcome the administrative and financial limitations to implement a 
sustainable social protection system. 
Once countries achieve this (arbitrary) level of economic development, the surpluses 
produced may then be used to finance social protection. Ostensibly, this appears to be 
the case; however, this assumption fails to take into account a variety of facts to the 
contrary. In particular, many countries have gone ahead with social protection in spite 
of their “disadvantage”, and made them work. Lesotho, ranked 151 out of 187 
countries in “economic development”6, provides a useful example to illustrate this 
point. In 2004, the government introduced an old age pension against the advice of 
international financial institutions (Freeland 2015; IMF 2016). Initially seen as 
untenable given its economic situation, the programme “has not only proved 
affordable, but the Government has been able to substantially increase its share of the 
domestic budget” (Freeland 2015). Additionally, the relatively high percentage of 
population over 60 covered (62 per cent) has engendered increasing levels of political 
support for its continuance and growth.   
Lesotho is by no means the exception to the rule; at least 15 additional countries with 
a relatively low level of economic development – ranked 100 or below in terms of GDP 
per capita (PPP I$) – have implemented social pensions without means testing.7 In 
April 2016, Zanzibar became the newest member of this group of low-income 
countries with universal pensions. The first government-funded universal pension in 
East Africa has a pension level of 20,000 Tsh (US$9 ), pegged to the cost of an 
essential basket of goods in the archipelago (HelpAge International 2016).  
Leaving these 16 instances (plus Zanzibar) to the side, the case for the economic 
viability and sustainability to implement basic social protection systems in 
developing countries may also be made using a (basic) counter-factual exercise. 
Using the economic threshold argument, we can compare how this logic holds up to 
the universalist Nordic states of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. To assess 
the validity of Assumption 2, we look at how many countries have already surpassed 
the economic development of Nordic countries by the time they implemented their 
first universal basic security pensions. Put simply, we are looking at whether the 
assumption that countries must be of a certain level of economic development to 
institute universal social protection stands up to the test, using the prototypical 
models of universality. 
Output-side real GDP per capita at chained PPP (in 2005 USD) is used as a proxy to 
operationalise the “economic development” variable.8 The data used to calculate the 
Nordic average is comprised of Sweden (1950), Finland (1956), Norway (1957), and 
6. GDP per capita on 
purchasing power parity (PPP) 
international dollars (I$) 
7. Kiribati, Samoa, Timor-Leste, 
Bolivia, Guyana and Namibia 
have all implemented universal 
social pensions. Uganda, Nepal, 
Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan, 
Moldova, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, 
Armenia and Swaziland, have 
implemented non-contributory 
pensions with additional 
targeting besides age (e.g. 
regional, pensions-tested, or in 
combination). 
8. “Chaining”, or chain-linking, 
enables GDP to be compared 
statistically over time. The 
OECD defines chain linking as: 
“Joining together two indices 
that overlap in one period by 
rescaling one of them to make 
its value equal to that of the 
other in the same period, thus 
combining them into single 
time series. More complex 
methods may be used to link 
together indices that overlap by 
more than period.” (ILO et al. 
2004). 
 
  
PensionWatch briefing no.15                                                                              6 
 
 
Denmark (1960).
9
 Data comes from the Penn World, Table 8.1 (Feenstra & Inklaar 
2015).  
Figure 2 illustrates the number of countries with an actual higher level of economic 
development than Nordic countries had by the time they implemented their first basic 
universal pensions. Out of 162 countries with available data, 81 (50 per cent) had a 
higher GDP per capita in 2011 than the Nordic threshold. If the median GDP per 
capita is used as the Nordic threshold, then an additional country (Colombia) joins the 
previous 81 cases referenced above.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
This is not to say that only 81 countries are economically able to implement non-
contributory pensions. The 16 cases mentioned above are by themselves enough 
evidence to show that exceeding this arbitrary economic development threshold is not 
a prerequisite to implementing social pension programmes. As mentioned previously, 
affordability is related more to political will than to fiscal resources. Countries can 
make social pensions affordable and economically viable through shifting 
expenditures from other areas or increasing government revenues via taxes 
(Barrientos 2004); official development assistance can also be considered as the third 
leg of the “triangle of social protection financing”.10 
Social protection in general, and social pensions in particular, is not only affordable, 
but its implementation promotes the economic growth which in turn makes social 
protection programmes even more viable. According to the UK Department for 
International Development (2006), social protection has a positive impact on 
economic growth by financing investment in social capital development (e.g. health 
and education), which in turn fosters complementary development in other areas of 
the state (DfID 2006). Bolstering this, Mathers and Slater (2014) argues that social 
protection promotes inclusive growth in low- and middle-income countries by 
increasing household productivity and local consumption, and by reducing the 
negative effects of economic and covariate shocks (e.g. financial crises and natural 
disasters). Indeed, social pensions, from a pragmatic view, represent the conduit by 
which the state supports households with economic opportunity rather than a drain 
on society. 
Note: The map shows in red 81 countries with a GDP per capita (PPP) higher than Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and Finland by the time they implemented the first universal basic security 
pensions. Countries in grey have a GDP per capita below the Nordic countries average. Countries 
with no available data (and the base countries) are in white. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Feenstra et al., (2015 ) 
 
Figure 2: Countries with a GDP per capita higher than the Nordic average by the time they 
implemented the first universal basic security pensions (PPP, in 2005 USD). 
 
9. Sweden is the only country 
where data does not correspond 
to the year of implementation of 
the basic pension. 
10. See Ortiz et al. (2015) and 
Harris (2013) for detailed 
descriptions and examples on 
how to increase fiscal space to 
finance social protection. 
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Concluding remarks 
Universal social pensions are politically and economically viable as well as efficient 
strategies to alleviate income poverty. This brief has illustrated that universal non-
contributory pensions can be implemented successfully in countries with low 
“economic development”, despite arguments to the contrary. However, for those who 
support the need to attain a certain degree of economic development as a prerequisite 
for implementing universal social pensions, there are 75 countries that have 
surpassed this economic threshold and still have not implemented universal social 
pensions. .  
Using five scenarios of age eligibility and two scenarios of benefit level in 79 
countries, this brief has illustrated that universal social pensions are affordable. This 
economic viability, however, must be accompanied with the political will to 
implement social pensions based on social justice and development. The international 
community must incentivise capacity building in LMICs to foster the environment for 
future social protection systems to survive. 
Finally, this brief notes that, contrary to the assumption that means testing ought to 
be the preferred mode of social protection targeting, universal targeting (overall) 
comes out on top as the social policy of preference – especially and acutely as a first 
step in the development of social protection systems in LMICs. Challenges to 
universalism do exist, but they exist somewhat outside the typical counter-arguments 
for its application. What universal targeting entails for LMICs is a need to reinvent 
universalism, as we know it from high-income Nordic countries. Governments should 
look towards implementing basic social protection policies that, with time and 
support, will be able to evolve into institutionalised and universal welfare systems – 
not, as neo-liberal thinking has hitherto pressured regional governments to accept, 
against it.  
Pensions, in particular, are a critical area of concern. This is the area of public 
spending which arguably by far shows the most buy-in and support over time for 
inclusive approaches, not least because of its capacity to level aggregated individual 
and group disadvantages. Such pension systems should consist of: basic universal 
pensions (as a social protection floor for the older population), and earnings-related 
contributory pensions as complementary schemes to promote employment in the 
formal sector and increase contributions to the social security system. The world 
clearly has the resources to implement this on a global scale; the question is if there is 
also the political will to do it. Social pensions, while often seen as dedicated 
interventions towards the older-age population, must also be seen in terms of 
relieving the stress on those households which find their genesis in the beneficiary – 
i.e. as one of the core (if not the basic) components of social protection strategies. 
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